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Differing views were however expressed on whether or not we should announce publicly in the summer of this year that we planned to withdraw wholly from the mainland of Asia (save for Hong Kong) by 1975-76 and on whether or not we should plan to provide some military capability for use in the Far East after that date. It was also suggested that if we were to maintain such a capability, there might be military, political and
perhaps financial advantage in our forces using facilities in Singapore
rather than facilities in Australia.
In considering whether or not we should announce publicly in the near future that we planned to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore by the mid-1970s, it was urged that only if we were to make such an announcement should we be abled both to withstand subsequent pressure to delay the date of our withdrawal, while the announcement of a date was also desirable to enable us most effectively to carry through our plans for the reduction of our forces (and consequently achieve the savings which we aimed to secure) and to provide effective economic aid in mitigation of the effect
of these reductions in the two countries concerned. Furthermore, an
announcement would have considerable advantage in relation to the political
situation in the United Kingdon,
G
Q
TO
It was recognised that such an announcement would cause serious
difficulties with our allies indeed the latest information on the
attitude of the United States Government showed a considerable hardening
in their attitude since the meeting of the SEATO Council in Washington in
April but it was urged that these difficulties had already been created
as a result of the consultations that had now taken place and, the diffi-
cultics having arisen, we should at least now not forego the financial gains which would result from our maintaining this policy. On the other
hand, it was urged that there would be grave damage to our political
relations with some of our major allies if, despite the views which they had
pressed upon us,w we were now to announce our intention to withdraw completely from the mainland of Asia by 1975-76. Moreover, although the initial consultations with the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore had been more favourable than we had previously expected, it might well prove
to be resee that subsequent pressure upon them by the United States,
Australia and New Zealand would result in our being faced with concertod demand from all our allies in this area to maintain our presence on the
mainland of Asia. It would be contrary to our best interests to estrange
ourselves from the United States on this issue at the present juncture,
whereas, if an announcement were to be delayed we might reasonably hopo that
after the ending of the conflict in Vietnam we could carry out our with-
drawal from the mainland in the same tine-scale, but without the major
political difficulties which at present appeared certain to ensue from an
announcement in 1967.
-ཡཏི ་.--
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